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Recent work has found that personality factors that confer vulnerability to addiction
can also affect learning and economic decision making. One personality trait which
has been implicated in vulnerability to addiction is intolerance to uncertainty (IU), i.e., a
preference for familiar over unknown (possibly better) options. In animals, the motivation
to obtain drugs is often assessed through conditioned place preference (CPP), which
compares preference for contexts where drug reward was previously received. It is
an open question whether participants with high IU also show heightened preference
for previously rewarded contexts. To address this question, we developed a novel
computer-based CPP task for humans in which participants guide an avatar through a
paradigm in which one room contains frequent reward (i.e., rich) and one contains less
frequent reward (i.e., poor). Following exposure to both contexts, subjects are assessed
for preference to enter the previously rich and previously poor room. Individuals with low
IU showed little bias to enter the previously rich room first, and instead entered both
rooms at about the same rate which may indicate a foraging behavior. By contrast,
those with high IU showed a strong bias to enter the previously rich room first. This
suggests an increased tendency to chase reward in the intolerant group, consistent
with previously observed behavior in opioid-addicted individuals. Thus, the personality
factor of high IU may produce a pre-existing cognitive bias that provides a mechanism
to promote decision-making processes that increase vulnerability to addiction.
Keywords: uncertainty, decision making, conditioned place preference (CPP), personality, addiction, humans
INTRODUCTION
Some individuals exposed to drugs of abuse develop addiction while others do not. One factor
mediating this difference in outcomes may be personality traits that confer biases in decision
making, such as a tendency to pursue familiar sources of reward at the expense of exploring
other (possibly more rewarding) options. Such individual differences have been studied in the
context of anxiety, but some of the same personality traits may also confer vulnerability to
addiction. Addiction has a high comorbidity rate with anxiety disorders (Merikangas et al., 1998;
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Grant et al., 2004). Based on their comorbidity, it is not
surprising that both types of disorders share other common
features, including behaviors such as withdrawal or avoidance,
changes in learning, and maladaptive decision making (e.g.,
risk taking, chasing reward). This alteration in decision making
is not limited to decisions about drugs, but can also affect
reward in general (Clark and Robbins, 2002). Drug use continues
regardless of the negative consequences (e.g., to health, income,
family), as do anxiety behaviors. Addiction and anxiety also
share some common neural mechanisms. Both come about
through some form of associative learning to a maladaptive
stimulus, specifically, anxiety via altered associative learning in
the amygdala (Packard and Cahill, 2001; Packard, 2009) and
addiction through altered reward learning in the mesolimbic
dopamine system (Robinson and Berridge, 2001; Everitt and
Robbins, 2005; Volkow et al., 2010). In addition, stress and
anxiety can lead to increased drug use and relapse (Jacobsen et al.,
2001; Sinha, 2001).
Learning, Personality and Vulnerability
Some recent work has examined the effects of personality
on vulnerability for anxiety disorders, and to a lesser extent,
addiction. Overall, the results suggest that personality factors,
including behavioral inhibition (BI) and harm avoidance,
hypothesized to be risk factors for anxiety disorders, are
associated with enhanced learning in a variety of tasks (Sheynin
et al., 2013, 2014; Allen et al., 2014; Holloway et al., 2014).
For example, BI is a temperamental tendency to withdraw
from or avoid novel social and non-social situations (Kagan
et al., 1987; Morgan, 2006). In addition to avoidance, BI
includes social reticence and enhanced reactivity to novelty,
threat, and uncertainty (Hirshfeld et al., 1992; Schwartz et al.,
2003). BI has long been considered a vulnerability factor for
the development of anxiety-related disorders including post-
traumatic stress disorder (Myers et al., 2012; Clauss et al., 2015).
Behaviorally inhibited individuals exhibit enhanced associative
learning as measured by eyeblink conditioning with a tone
conditioned stimulus (CS) and a corneal air puff unconditioned
stimulus (US) (Allen et al., 2014, 2016; Holloway et al., 2014),
and with increased avoidance in a computer-based task (Sheynin
et al., 2014). Enhanced avoidance learning was also observed
in male, but not female, opioid addicts undergoing methadone
maintenance therapy, when compared to controls, using the same
task (Sheynin et al., 2016).
In addition to these findings with basic classical conditioning
and avoidance learning, the effects of personality factors have
been examined with computer-based tasks involving economic
decision making. For example, Radell et al. (2016) used a
cognitive economic decision making task based on socials
interactions (i.e., the trust game) with behaviorally inhibited
individuals. This task, based on the version used by Delgado
et al. (2005), had participants read the biographies of partners
in the game that portrayed them as morally trustworthy (“good
partner”), untrustworthy (“bad partner”), or neutral (“neutral
partner”). On each trial, participants were shown a partner and
were given a choice of keeping $1 or sharing $3 with that
partner. If the money was shared, the partner had the choice of
keeping it all or reciprocating by returning half of the money
($1.50). On any trial in which the participant chose to share, the
partner always reciprocated with 50% probability, irrespective of
how they were portrayed in the biography. Inhibited individuals
tended to share with the neutral partner less than uninhibited
individuals; however, this behavioral difference was not evident
in the ratings of trustworthiness for the “neutral partner.” These
results suggest that inhibited individuals may be predisposed
to interpret neutral or ambiguous information more negatively,
which may contribute to the tendency to avoid unfamiliar people
characteristic of behaviorally inhibited temperament, and its
relationship to anxiety disorders.
Probabilistic category learning tasks that include both reward
and punishment trials have also revealed a role for anxiety
vulnerability factors in economic decision making (Sheynin et al.,
2013). On each trial, participants view a stimulus and are asked
to categorize it. The categories are probabilistic in that each
stimulus is a member of one category 80% of the time and
a member of the other category 20% of the time. For some
stimuli, correct categorization results in a reward (point gain)
and incorrect categorization results in no feedback; for other
stimuli, incorrect categorization results in a punishment (point
loss) and correct categorization results in no feedback. Thus,
performance on reward and punishment trials can be directly
contrasted, as can the interpretation of the ambiguous “no-
feedback” outcome, which can signal either failure to obtain
reward or successful avoidance of punishment. Behaviorally
inhibited individuals demonstrated better associative learning on
both reward and punishment trials. Given the option to opt out
of individual trials to avoid any chance of being punished or
rewarded, inhibited individuals also preferred to opt out to avoid
punishment (Sheynin et al., 2013). In a follow-up study, using this
task, participants with severe symptoms of post-traumatic stress
disorder exhibited enhanced learning, specifically on reward
trials, relative to peers with fewer or no symptoms (Myers et al.,
2013).
Extending this task to the topic of addiction, Myers
et al. (2016) found that opioid-addicted individuals undergoing
methadone maintenance therapy were more likely to abandon
previous response rules and explore new alternatives when
expectancies were violated (i.e., increased lose-shift behavior),
relative to controls. Thus, addicted participants tended to
respond based on immediate feedback, which may explain why
they continue to pursue short-term reward while ignoring the
long-term negative consequences of drug use (Myers et al., 2016).
Likewise, in other decision-making tasks, addicts tend to choose
small immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards, and display
a number of other changes in decision making compared to
control participants (Petry et al., 1998; Clark and Robbins, 2002).
Additionally, at least some of these changes appear to persist
even after long-term abstinence (Li et al., 2013). However, it is
important to note that a preference for small immediate rewards
over large delayed rewards is not specific to addicts – it has been
shown in both humans and animals, and is a function of multiple
factors including the length of the delay, age, intelligence (Mischel
and Metzner, 1962), and the amount of reward (Green et al.,
1997). Thus, addiction is only associated with an exaggeration
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of this preference, which may reflect increased impulsivity or
reduced self-control (Madden et al., 2003).
The Role of Uncertainty
One common feature of most of the tasks discussed above is
some aspect of uncertainty that was associated with performance
improvements. Acquisition of eyeblink conditioning was
enhanced in anxiety-vulnerable individuals under protocols
which included schedules of partial reinforcement with 50% CS
alone and 50% US alone trials (Allen et al., 2014), and variability
in trial timing (Allen et al., 2016). In contrast, vulnerability did
not modulate performance on a standard 100% CS-US paired
trials protocol. In the computer avoidance task (Sheynin et al.,
2014), participants were given no instructions and had to learn,
through trial-and-error, what behavior resulted in avoiding point
loss. In the trust game (Radell et al., 2016), all partners shared
50% of the time regardless of the nature of their biographies
but individuals with anxiety vulnerability only differed in how
they treated the neutral partner. The probabilistic category
learning task (Myers et al., 2016) involved uncertainty in that
it was not possible to be correct 100% of the time based on the
probabilistic nature of the categories. There was also a mix of
reward and punishment trials, and no feedback was given on
correct punishment trials and incorrect reward trials. Finally,
tasks that pit immediate small rewards against larger delayed
rewards (Petry et al., 1998; Clark and Robbins, 2002) may also
involve perceived uncertainty in that there is no guarantee that
the delayed reward will actually be received.
Given the possible role of uncertainty in most prior tasks
examining the role of individual differences in anxiety and
addiction vulnerability, the purpose of the current study was to
test how personality can modulate economic decision making
for rewards in healthy individuals, focusing on intolerance to
uncertainty (IU) – another personality factor that has been linked
to anxiety disorders (Dugas et al., 1997; Ladouceur et al., 1997;
Birrell et al., 2011; Carleton, 2012; Grupe and Nitschke, 2013).
IU can be defined as a tendency to perceive uncertain situations
as aversive and stressful, and respond with BI and negative
expectations about their possible consequences (Nelson et al.,
2015). Initially, IU was linked to generalized anxiety disorder, and
is a strong predictor of the tendency to worry (Dugas et al., 1997;
Ladouceur et al., 1997). However, other studies suggest that it is
not specific to that disorder, but constitutes a broader risk factor
for the development and maintenance of anxiety and depression
(Tolin et al., 2003; Carleton, 2012; Carleton et al., 2012).
In recent work, individuals undergoing treatment for opioid
dependence had significantly higher IU, as measured with the
IU scale (Carleton et al., 2007), compared to healthy controls,
suggesting that IU may also be a risk factor in substance abuse
and addiction. This evidence is, of course, correlational and a
causal relationship, if any, remains to be established. Still, IU
implies reduced risk taking, in contrast to substance abuse and
addiction, associated with increased impulsivity and risk taking.
Thus, if higher IU does contribute to addiction vulnerability, this
relationship may be indirect and only appear in a subpopulation
of individuals who, for example, may have started substance
use as a form of self-medication for anxiety. Along the same
lines, pathological gambling – also associated with increased risk
taking – is also often comorbid with anxiety disorders (Lorains
et al., 2011), which are, in contrast, linked to higher risk aversion
(Maner and Schmidt, 2006) and greater IU (Ladouceur et al.,
1997). As with the relationship between IU and addiction, these
contradictory findings might be resolved if pathological gamblers
are not a homogenous group of individuals, but rather consist
of multiple subtypes, only one of which represents impulsive
risk-takers (Blaszczynski and Nower, 2002). IU has also been
linked to changes in economic decision making and reward
system function (Nelson et al., 2015). Using a gambling task,
Nelson et al. (2015) found IU could modulate event-related
potential responses to gains and losses, which have been linked
to activation in the ventral striatum and medial prefrontal cortex,
and activation in the anterior cingulate cortex, respectively.
Individuals with higher IU are more likely to perceive situations
as uncertain, and have stronger emotional responses (e.g.,
increased anxiety) under those conditions (Ladouceur et al.,
1997). They also tend to require additional information before
making a decision, and paradoxically avoid cues that can lead
to anxiety, which would in practice reduce the amount of
information available for decision making (Ladouceur et al.,
1997; Krain et al., 2006). Similar to drug addicted individuals,
individuals with higher IU were more likely to choose small,
low-probability rewards over larger but delayed high-probability
rewards (Luhmann et al., 2011).
Conditioned Place Preference
We sought to continue this line of research by investigating
the role of IU on learning in a computer-based economic
decision making task, similar to the conditioned place preference
(CPP) paradigm widely applied to the study of addiction in
animal models. CPP has been commonly used to measure the
reward value of different drugs of abuse (for reviews, see Bardo
and Bevins, 2000; Tzschentke, 2007). Here, drug-free subjects
(typically rodents), are first allowed to explore an apparatus
consisting of at least two distinct interconnected chambers to
measure initial preference (i.e., by comparing time spent in
each context). In subsequent conditioning sessions, the animal
is injected with a drug and confined to one chamber. Similarly,
the other context is paired with saline. Finally, drug-free subjects
are once again allowed to choose between the compartments
in order to assess preference. A large number of studies have
shown animals spend more time in the drug-paired than in the
saline-paired compartment for a wide variety of drugs, including
opioids (e.g., heroin, methadone), and psychomotor stimulants
(e.g., cocaine, amphetamine) (Bardo et al., 1995). CPP has also
been observed for non-drug rewards including food (Spyraki
et al., 1982), water, and access to sexual interaction (Oldenburger
et al., 1992) or a running wheel (Lett et al., 2000).
Here, we report results from a computer-based CPP task
where humans guide an avatar through a paradigm in which one
room contains frequent reward and one contains less frequent
reward. Following exposure to both contexts, participants were
assessed for preference to enter the previously rich and previously
poor room. IU was assessed via a self-report questionnaire.
An important limitation of animal CPP as a model of human
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substance abuse and addiction is that rewards are simply
administered by the experimenter, and are not contingent on
behavior (e.g., animals are injected with drug or confined to a
compartment containing reward). In contrast, humans choose to
start taking the drug and control the frequency of administration.
To address this concern, in the current task, obtaining reward
was contingent on operant responding by the participants. We
predicted that if IU contributes to decision making that can
promote substance abuse and addiction, individuals with higher
IU should show a stronger bias toward the previously rich room,
compared to individuals with lower IU, who might be more prone
to explore other options.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 88 participants were recruited from the University of
Northern Colorado, and received research credit in a psychology
class as payment for their participation. Data from 12 participants
were lost due to computer failure. The remaining sample (n= 76)
contained 50 females and had a mean age of 20.7 (SD = 5.4,
range = 18–56), and education of 13.8 years (SD = 1.4,
range = 12–17). All participants provided informed consent
before initiation of any behavioral testing. Procedures were
approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of
Northern Colorado, and conformed to guidelines established by
the Federal Government and the Declaration of Helsinki for the
protection of human subjects.
Procedure
Testing took place in a quiet room. All participants completed
the brief, 12-item version of the Intolerance to Uncertainty
Scale (IUS-12; Carleton et al., 2007), and a computer-based CPP
task programmed in the Java 8 language (Oracle Corporation,
Redwood City, CA, USA), administered on a desktop computer
running Windows. The task, illustrated in Figure 1, consisted
of a tutorial, pretest, training and a posttest phase. Participants
controlled a cartoon avatar (a fox) and were instructed to help the
fox collect as many golden eggs as possible. The exact instructions
are provided in the Appendix. The task began with a tutorial
where the fox was placed in a lobby area with a single door in
the middle. Participants were told that they could click on the
door to switch between rooms. Once they did, the fox entered a
room with eight chests, and participants were prompted to click
on the chests to collect two golden eggs. When the participant
clicked on a chest, the fox moved to inspect that chest. The chest
was then opened to reveal whether an egg was inside. During the
tutorial, all chests always contained eggs. Therefore, the subject’s
first two choices were always rewarded. The total score (i.e., total
eggs collected by participants) was always visible at the top of the
screen.
Next, participants began the pretest, during which they once
again started in the lobby area (Figure 1B), but were given a
choice between two doors (blue and brown) on the sides of
the room. The left or right placement of the two doors was
counterbalanced across participants. The doors led to two visually
distinct rooms (blue and brown, Figures 1C,D), which contained
eight chests each arranged in a circular pattern. Both rooms were
visually distinct from each other, and from the room encountered
in the tutorial. For the next 4 min, participants were allowed to
freely explore the virtual environment, switching between rooms
and clicking on chests to acquire eggs. During the pretest, each
chest had an initial 5% chance of containing reward. Throughout
the task, whenever an egg was found in a particular chest, the
chest’s subsequent chance of reward decreased to 0, and increased
back to the maximum at increments of 1% every 4 s. Thus,
repeatedly searching the same chest was not encouraged. Rather,
the optimum strategy was to move around a room exploring
different chests. Participants, however, were not told anything
about reward contingencies and had to rely on trial-and-error.
The amount of time spent in each of the rooms, the total number
and order of chest clicks, and the total score was recorded. For
each subject, the room (blue or brown) where that participant
had spent more time during the pretest was defined as the “more
preferred” room and the other as the “less preferred” room.
The pretest was followed by the training phase, which
consisted of two parts (2 min each). At the start of each part
of the training phase, the fox was placed in the lobby, but
only one of the doors was available, forcing participants to
enter one of the side rooms. Once they entered the room, they
were locked in (Figure 1E) and had to remain there until the
second part of training. The second part of training began in
the same way, with the fox placed in the lobby and only the
remaining door available. The less preferred room during the
pretest was assigned to be the rich room, meaning that each
chest had an initial 80% chance of containing an egg. The other
room was assigned to be the poor room, where each chest had
an initial 5% chance of containing an egg. As in the pretest,
once an egg was found in a chest, reward chance decreased to
0 and gradually increased back to initial levels at increments
of 10% (for the rich room) or 1% for the poor room, every
4 s. Whether participants were locked in the rich or the poor
room first was counterbalanced. Again, the order and number
of chests clicked was recorded, along with the number of eggs
obtained.
Finally, participants completed a posttest, which was identical
to the pretest. The fox was placed in the lobby with both blue
and brown rooms freely available. All chests had an initial 5%
chance of containing an egg. Here, the first room entered by
participants, and the time spent in each room (previously rich
vs. previously poor) were recorded, along with the order and
number of chests clicked and the number of eggs obtained.
After the task, all participants completed a questionnaire (see
the Appendix) about their knowledge of reward contingencies,




The mean score on the IUS-12 was 32.25 (SD= 8.58, range= 14–
57). For all analyses, subjects were split into high or low IU
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FIGURE 1 | Design of the computer-based conditioned place preference task. (A) The task consisted of a tutorial, pretest, training and a posttest phase.
(B) Participants controlled an avatar (the fox), which was placed in the lobby area (shown here) at the start of each phase. The lobby area contained two doors.
During the pretest and posttest, participants were freely allowed to switch between a (C) blue and a (D) brown room by using the mouse to click on the doors, and
could also click on the chests to search for golden eggs, increasing their total score. Each chest initially had a 5% chance of containing an egg. Whether the blue
room door in the lobby was on the left or the right was counterbalanced. (E) In the training phase, participants were forced to enter one, then the other, room and
locked inside. In one room (“rich room”), each chest initially had an 80% chance of containing an egg, in contrast to the other (“poor room”) where each chest initially
had a 5% chance. Whether participants were forced to enter the rich or the poor room first during training was counterbalanced.
groups based on the sample median of 32, with 37 participants
(25 female) classed as low, and 39 (25 female) classed as high.
The high and low IU groups did not differ in gender distribution,
χ2(1)= 0.101, p= 0.750, or age, t(74)= 0.284, p= 0.778.
In the post-task questionnaire, in response to “Did you think
that one of the rooms had more eggs in it?” 78.9% of participants
responded “yes,” χ2(1) = 25.5, p < 0.001. Out of those who said
“yes,” 90% also correctly identified the rich room, χ2(1) = 38.4,
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p< 0.001. Thus, most participants were explicitly aware of which
room was more rewarding. Finally, 64.5% of the participants
reported they had previously played computer or video games,
χ2(1) = 6.4, p = 0.012, and 61.8% reported they had followed a
specific strategy while searching for eggs, χ2(1) = 4.3, p = 0.039.
Among the strategies mentioned were going in circles or zig zags
and checking all of the chests once then switching rooms.
Conditioned Place Preference Task
Since participants were assigned to one of four conditions to
counterbalance which context (blue or brown) was on the left or
right in the lobby, and whether the rich or the poor room was
experienced first during training, we first examined whether this
led to an initial preference bias as a function of IU. The mean
percent of the time participants spent in the blue room during
the pretest was computed as total time spent in the blue side
room divided by sum of the total time spent in the blue and
brown rooms (Figures 2A,B). A 2 (blue on left vs. right)× 2 (rich
room first vs. second) × 2 (IU high vs. low) between-subjects
ANOVA on the percent time spent in the blue room during
the pretest confirmed that there were no significant main effects
(all F < 1.720, all p > 0.19) or interactions (all F < 1.320, all
p > 0.25). Thus, on average, participants tended to divide their
time equally, spending approximately 50% of the time in each of
the side rooms, eliminating initial bias as a potential explanation
of the results in subsequent analyses. The average total number
of entries made into each room by high and low IU participants
was also examined (Figure 2C). A 2 (left vs. right room) × 2
(IU high vs. low) mixed-model ANOVA confirmed there were
no significant main effects (both F < 0.900 and p > 0.34), and
no significant interaction, F(1,74)= 1.618, p= 0.207. Thus, both
groups of participants had enough time to make multiple visits to
each room during the pretest.
As our primary analysis, we examined whether participants
tended to enter the previously rich or the previously poor room
first at the start of the posttest, i.e., whether they first entered the
room paired with a high chance of reward (maximum 80%) or a
low chance of reward (maximum 5%) during the training phase.
It is important to note that during the posttest, both rooms were
once again equivalent and paired with a low chance of reward
(maximum 5%) as in the pretest. As expected, most participants
entered the previously-rich room first, χ2(1) = 10.32, p = 0.001
(Figure 3A). However, surprisingly, approximately 30% of
participants instead chose to enter the previously poor room. This
could be due to differences in personality between participants,
or a function of whether the last room experienced during the
training phase was the rich or the poor room. To examine this
possibility, we performed log-linear analysis – an extension of
the chi-square test used for more than two categorical variables –
on the total number of participants with factors of the first
room entered during the posttest, the last room (rich or poor)
experienced during the training phase, and IU (high or low).
A non-hierarchical (forced-entry) method was used to enter
factors into the model. The log-linear analysis produced a model
that retained only the main effects and two-way interactions,
and had a perfect fit to the data. The only significant two-way
interaction was between the first room entered in the posttest
and IU, X2p (1) = 4.578, p = 0.032. The three-way interaction
and the remaining two-way interactions (first room entered in
posttest × last room in training and IU × last room in training)
were not significant (all X2 < 3.7, all p’s> 0.05). Figure 3B shows
the percent of the total participants as a function of whether they
entered the rich or the poor room first, and IU. Based on the
odds ratio, participants who had high IU had 3.87 times higher
odds of first going to the rich room in the posttest compared
to participants who had low IU. Thus, participants with high
IU tended to show greater CPP by going back to the previously
rewarded context (i.e., followed a win-stay strategy) while those
with low IU instead explored a different room (i.e., followed a
win-shift strategy). The absence of other significant effects in the
loglinear analysis suggests that this behavior was specifically a
function of IU rather than other variables, such as which room
participants had most recently been in during the prior training
phase.
Similar analyses were performed to eliminate other possible
confounds. IU and the first room entered in the posttest
were always included in the model, while the third factor was
whether or not participants reported they knew which room
had more eggs (i.e., knew the rich room), had previous game
experience or reported following a specific strategy. There was
a significant three-way interaction between knowledge of the
rich room, IU and the first room entered in the posttest,
χ2(1) = 6.028, p = 0.014. To examine this interaction, a total
of four Bonferroni-corrected two-sided Fisher’s exact tests (alpha
adjusted to 0.05/4 = 0.0125) were performed with factors of
IU and first room entered in the posttest. The first two tests
were performed separately on individuals who reported they
knew vs. did not know which room had more eggs. The result
was significant only for individuals who reported they knew
the rich room (p = 0.001 vs. p = 0.518). The second set of
tests were performed on the subset of individuals who reported
they knew the rich room, split by whether they also correctly
identified that room. This confirmed a significant difference only
for those who could identify the room (p = 0.001 vs. p = 0.467).
Therefore, the interaction between IU and the first room entered
during the posttest appears driven by participants who could
explicitly identify the rich room. To avoid confusion, note that
test statistics are not generated for Fisher’s exact test, therefore
only p-values are reported. Finally, when game experience was
examined, the model retained only the main effects and two-
way interactions – the only significant two-way interaction was
once again between IU and the first room entered in the posttest,
X2p (1) = 8.684, p = 0.003. Similarly this was the only significant
two-way interaction when whether or not participants had a
strategy was included as the third factor, X2p (1) = 7.3, p = 0.007.
Thus, neither game experience nor following a strategy were
related to IU, or to which room participants entered first during
the posttest. Across analyses, this depended on IU, and was also
related to explicit knowledge of the rich room.
Having entered one room first in the posttest, we next
examined whether participants tended to stay there, spending
more time, overall, in that room. A 2 (rich vs. poor room entered
first)× 2 (IU high vs. low) ANOVA was performed on the percent
of the total time spent in the rich room during the posttest
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FIGURE 2 | (A,B) Mean percent time spent in the blue room during the pretest as a function of training order and IU. There were no significant differences confirming
that initially, all groups had no strong preference and divided their time equally between the blue and brown rooms. This was irrespective of which room was on the
right or on the left, and whether the less-preferred room (assigned to be the rich room) was experienced first or second during training. (C) Average total number of
entries into the left or right room during the pretest as a function of IU. All participants, irrespective of IU, made a similar number of visits to each room. Error bars
represent ± SEM.
(Figure 4). This was calculated as total time in the rich room
divided by total time in the rich plus the poor room. There were
no significant differences (all p’s > 0.05). Thus, despite the initial
preference to enter the previously rich room, most participants
did not simply remain in the originally chosen room. Rather,
across the whole posttest, participants tended to divide their time
equally between the two rooms.
Next, we assessed locomotion in the posttest, first considering
movement between rooms (Figure 5), then total chest clicks
within each room (Figure 6). A mixed-model ANOVA was
performed on total side room entries during the posttest with
a within-subjects factor of the room entered (rich or poor),
and between-subjects factors of the first room entered during
the posttest (rich or poor) and IU (high or low). This yielded
significant interactions between the first room entered and IU,
F(1,72) = 4.71, p = 0.033, η2p = 0.061, and between total
entries into the rich or poor rooms and the first room entered,
F(1,72) = 24.702, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.255. There were no
other significant interactions or main effects (all p’s > 0.05).
Post hoc Bonferroni-corrected independent samples t-tests were
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FIGURE 3 | Percent of total participants who chose to enter the previously rich or previously poor room first, at the start of the posttest. (A) While
most participants chose to enter the previously rich room first, surprisingly, about 30% went to the previously poor room first. (B) This behavior depended on IU.
Participants with high IU were more likely to enter the previously rich room first in the posttest, and less likely to enter the previously poor room first, compared to
participants with low IU.
FIGURE 4 | Mean percent time spent in the previously rich room during
the posttest as a function of the first room entered and IU. There were
no significant differences. Error bars represent ± SEM.
conducted to further examine the significant interactions (alpha
adjusted to 0.05/4 = 0.0125). The interaction between the first
room entered and total room entries appeared to be driven by
individuals with high IU making more entries into the poor
room (Figure 5A), however, the test comparing entries into the
previously poor room entries by high vs. low IU participants
failed to reach corrected significance, t(22) = 2.18, p = 0.04.
The interaction between total entries and the first room entered
was due to participants who first entered the rich room tending
to make more re-entries into that same room throughout the
posttest, t(60.92) = 3.27, p = 0.002, r = 0.39 (Figure 5B). There
was no significant difference in entries into the poor room as
a function of which room was entered first during training.
Overall, it is important to note that while there were some
significant differences, effect sizes are small and the differences
amounted to, on average, one or two additional room entries.
More importantly, these data indicate participants remained
active and continued to switch between rooms throughout the
posttest.
A mixed-model ANOVA was also performed on the total
number of chest clicks (sum of the clicks on all eight chests)
within each side room (Figure 6), with within-subjects factor of
the room (rich or poor), and between-subjects factors of the first
room entered (rich or poor) and IU (high or low). There were
no significant differences (all p > 0.05). Sample graphs of the
path taken by two individuals during the pretest and posttest, one
from the low IU and one from the high IU groups (Figure 7),
also indicate that participants remained motivated, continuing to
switch rooms and check different reward locations, throughout
the task. Note that while some individuals did show a strong
preference for one room during the posttest (Figure 7B), on
average, participants spent approximately equal amounts of time
in both rooms, irrespective of IU. In contrast, as described earlier,
individuals with high IU tended to visit the previously rich room
first during the posttest.
Finally, univariate ANOVA was performed on the total score
(number of eggs collected) with between-subjects factors of
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FIGURE 5 | Movement between rooms in the computer-based task. (A) Mean total side room (blue and brown room) entries during the posttest as a function
of the first room entered and IU. There was a significant interaction, however, post hoc independent samples t-tests fell short of corrected significance. (B) Mean
total entries into the previously rich and -poor rooms during the posttest as a function of the first room entered. Significantly more re-entries were made into the
previously rich room when that room was also the one first entered during the posttest. In contrast, total entries into the previously poor room were similar
irrespective of which room was entered first. Error bars represent ± SEM. ∗ indicates significant difference, p < 0.01.
FIGURE 6 | Movement within each side room during the posttest expressed as the mean total chest clicks in the (A) previously poor and (B)
previously rich room, as a function of the first room entered and IU. There were no significant differences. Error bars represent ± SEM.
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FIGURE 7 | Path taken by two participants chosen at random, one from the (A) low IU group, and one from the (B) high IU group, during the pretest
and posttest. The starting location, always in the lobby (center), is marked by a circle. The room each participant spent less time in during the pretest was assigned
to be the rich room during training, and as described earlier, both side rooms had a maximum 5% chance of reward during the tests. The chests participants could
search for eggs are marked with a “C.”
the first room entered during the posttest and IU. There were
no significant differences (all p’s > 0.05) indicating that on
average, all participants obtained similar scores, irrespective of
IU (Figure 8). Thus, differences in the amount of reward obtained
during the training phase cannot account for the tendency of high
IU individuals to choose to enter the previously rich room first
during the posttest.
DISCUSSION
The current study found that individuals with low IU showed
little bias to enter the previously rich room first, and instead
entered both rooms at about the same rate. In contrast, those
with high IU had a strong bias to enter the previously rich
room first (i.e., increased win-stay). This interaction appeared
to be driven by participants who could identify the previously
rich room. These findings could not be explained by differences
in initial room preference, by prior video or computer game
experience or in the total reward obtained by participants. It was
also not related to whether or not participants reported following
a specific strategy in the task. There are at least two possible
interpretations of this result – first, individuals with high IU may
have selected the safer, more certain choice, by returning to the
previously rewarded context. Second, this could also indicate an
increased tendency to chase reward, consistent with previously
observed behavior in heroin addicts in a probabilistic category
learning task (Myers et al., 2016). In either case, this tendency
may represent a pre-existing cognitive bias, possibly based on
personality, which could promote decision-making processes
that increase vulnerability to addiction. However, unlike the
Myers et al. (2016) study, where the tendency to chase reward
was expressed as exploration of new response options following
expectancy violations (i.e., a lose-shift strategy), in the current
task, participants chose the previously rewarded option (i.e., a
win-stay strategy). This could be because, here, the response
represents the first choice made in the posttest, precluding the
influence of expectancy violations.
Another possible interpretation of this result, within an active
inference framework (Friston et al., 2015), involves a change
in the balance between pragmatic actions – actions that exploit
previously rewarded strategies – and epistemic actions, which
serve to discover new information that, long-term, may improve
selection of pragmatic actions. According to this view, the value
of an action is related to both its extrinsic value (i.e., expected
reinforcement value) and its epistemic value (i.e., expected
information gain). Here, actors seek out surprising outcomes,
which will ultimately reduce uncertainty through information
gain, and help construct a better internal model of the world.
While short-term, this may require moving away from a goal
(i.e., choosing to visit a previously less-rewarded location), the
subsequent improved model would allow for better strategies to
obtain a goal in the future (Friston et al., 2015). IU may involve
a reduction in epistemic value in favor of increased extrinsic
value, leading to behavior guided by preferences, i.e., prior
beliefs about reinforcement contingencies. This interpretation
is also consistent with the BI component of IU, which may
paradoxically reduce information gain and therefore preclude
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FIGURE 8 | Mean total score obtained in the task. There were no
significant differences. Note that the first two points all participants obtained
during the tutorial do not count toward this total. Error bars represent ± SEM.
resolving uncertainty in the long-term (Ladouceur et al., 1997;
Krain et al., 2006).
Overall, we did not observe a CPP effect. That is, despite the
fact that a majority of participants entered the previously rich
room first, when considering behavior across the entire posttest
period, participants did not spend a majority of the time in
the previously rich room. This behavioral pattern may reflect a
different strategy than simple CPP. Some individuals may have
been foraging or choosing where and how to seek reward, much
like animals search for food in the natural environment. Decision
making in a foraging scenario would involve deciding between a
limited number of options which have different probabilities of
reward and amount of reward (Platt and Huettel, 2008). Foraging
also includes some risk or cost in choosing to look elsewhere
for food. This cost may take the form of energy expenditure to
travel to some other location where more food may be available.
Another cost is the amount of time that it would take to arrive at
the other location. Cognitive decisions to forage involve several
factors including the value of each option, an estimate of the
average value in the environment, as well as the cost of leaving the
current location to search elsewhere (Kolling et al., 2012). In the
current task, there was very little cost of time or energy in moving
from room to room. Therefore, this scenario did not include
risk of energy expenditure or much time lost. Thus, the freedom
to switch rooms without penalty would have made foraging
behavior a viable strategy to possibly achieve more reward.
A tendency from the foraging literature that may have been
expressed by our high IU group is known as the ambiguity effect,
where when given a choice between two options, one in which
the probabilities are known and one in which the probabilities are
unknown, most avoid the option with no probability information
(Camerer and Weber, 1992). This avoidance of a choice with
unknown probability of outcomes could be an indication of IU.
If high IU individuals knew which room was more rewarding,
they may have tended to not shift their initial search to the other
room, which in the past held less reward, but now may hold
more. However, low IU persons exhibited a pattern of searching
both rooms at similar rates. Low IU persons may have been
more open to the risk of losing reward in the previously rich
room if it was possible that more reward was available in the
other room. Foraging has been tested in a computer environment
(Goldstone and Ashpole, 2004), but the task involved a large
number of participants interacting in real time in a virtual
world. Based on a computational model, Goldstone and Ashpole
(2004) suggested that some people tend to sample all locations
with equal frequency while others tend to sample locations with
greater rewards. Our current results would predict that these two
tendencies may be found in two separate groups of individuals –
those with lower IU would tend to sample all locations while
those with higher IU would tend to sample locations of greater
reward.
As noted earlier, individuals in the current study did not show
an overall preference for the previously rich context. This could
be because the current task differed in several ways from the
CPP paradigms used in previous human and animal studies. In
contrast to the work in animals, far fewer studies have attempted
to examine CPP in humans. For example, in a study by Childs
and de Wit (2009), humans received d-amphetamine or placebo
in separate rooms. Participants reported higher liking for the
drug-paired room. Molet et al. (2013) used a computer-based
task where a distinct virtual environment was paired with either
pleasant music or static noise. Analogous to animal studies,
time spent in each context served as the dependent measure,
and participants showed greater preference for the context
paired with pleasant music. Finally, Astur et al. (2014) assessed
preference for two distinct virtual rooms after one of them was
paired with chocolate M&Ms. Similar to studies in animals, the
participants spent more time in the chocolate-paired room, but
only if they were food deprived.
Thus, similar to studies in animals, most human studies of
CPP have employed either natural rewards (e.g., food, water)
or drugs of abuse, while studies of economic decision making
have used monetary gains. Nonetheless, most participants in the
current study remained motivated throughout the task, despite
only receiving golden eggs, as indicated by reliable movement and
egg collection. The difference in the type of reinforcer, however,
remains a possible explanation for the lack of overall preference in
the current study, although note that Molet et al. (2013) were able
to observe CPP to music. Similar to Childs and de Wit (2009),
most participants in the current study reported that they knew
which room was more rewarding, and were able to correctly
identify that room. Despite this, there was no overall preference,
and approximately 30% of participants first chose to enter the
poor room during the posttest.
Another difference between this and other studies, which
could account for the lack of overall preference, is in the
duration of training. Animal studies typically involve multiple
conditioning sessions, spread over several days, with training
and testing on separate days. The study of Astur et al. (2014)
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in humans employed six 6-min sessions, with a 5 min break
between each session, with training and testing on separate days.
On the other hand, as in the current study, Molet et al. (2013)
employed only two 2-min conditioning sessions but still observed
a preference. However, in contrast to the current study, Molet
et al. (2013) used an unbiased procedure where each context
is paired with a stimulus, in counterbalanced order – there
was no pretest. Here, a biased procedure was used where the
least preferred room during the pretest was paired with reward.
Additionally, Molet et al. (2013) did not restrict the duration of
the preference test, while here both tests were 4 min long. This
was to ensure participants remained motivated and to reduce
frustration given that the chance of reward was, at most, 5%
during each test. It is possible that participants did not have
enough time to explore each of the available locations and
become familiar with the task. This is unlikely, given that on
average, participants were able to switch between rooms several
times despite the time limit (as shown by the average total
room entries). Still, the duration of the test may have precluded
observing an overall preference, which could be examined in
future studies.
Finally, unlike prior studies of economic decision making,
participants did not receive more or less reward depending on
their decisions to stay in each location. This was by design
since differences in the reinforcement value between locations
during the test would confound interpretation of any preference
observed (i.e., such preference could be due to experiences during
training and testing). In the future, the task could be modified
to examine the preference between a poor room with potentially
higher gains, but lower gain on average, and a rich room with
lower but reliable gains. Similarly, the task could be modified
to examine the effect of IU on both reward and punishment
learning by introducing a chance to lose points when foraging
in particular locations (e.g., to assess preference for a location
associated with high risk and high reward). These alternatives
may have a strong effect on preference, and alter the foraging
strategy used by participants as a function of IU.
In both human and animal studies of CPP, reward is
not contingent on operant responding. In the context of
substance abuse, however, humans choose to start taking the
drug and control the frequency of administration. Similar
choices are involved in the context of foraging and economic
decision making. Animal studies have typically used an operant
conditioning paradigm to study these processes, where subjects
learn to press a lever to self-administer drugs or obtain
other rewards (Balster and Lukas, 1985; Bardo and Bevins,
2000). Most standard self-administration studies, however, do
not consider the role of contextual cues. Thus, the current
task combined the two approaches in order to examine both
contextual conditioning, and placed reward under the control
of participants. In doing so, the task likely also taps into
different mechanisms compared to traditional CPP paradigms.
For example, behaviorally, the magnitude of rodent CPP is
often dissociated from the rate of self-administration (Bardo
et al., 1999). The two paradigms also appear to engage different
neural substrates. For example, pretreatment with D2 dopamine
receptor antagonists has no effect on CPP to cocaine (Cervo and
Samanin, 1995), but attenuates self-administration (Caine and
Koob, 1994), suggesting that dopaminergic neurotransmission
may only be involved in the primary reinforcing effects of
cocaine, but not the secondary reinforcing properties acquired
by contextual stimuli paired with cocaine (Bardo and Bevins,
2000). Finally, the ability of drugs of abuse to activate the
mesolimbic dopamine system is also contingent on whether drug
administration is under the operant control of the animal (Di
Ciano et al., 1998).
Although the current task was probabilistic in that reward
was not always guaranteed, the contrast between the two rooms
during conditioning (5 vs. 80% chance of reward) should have
been immediately apparent. When the rich room reverted to
5% chance of reward during the posttest, this may have led to
rapid extinction, in particular since reward was under operant
control, precluding observing a preference using time spent in the
previously rich context as the dependent measure. While rodent
CPP studies have used a 0 vs. 100% contrast, reward was not
under operant control like it was in the current study. Regardless,
the lack of an overall preference could also suggest that the effect
of IU is not very strong in reality. Still, it may be possible to
amplify this effect by increasing uncertainty (e.g., for example
if the contrast is between 20 and 80% chance of reward). The
number of chests in each context may have also played a role – the
number was small enough to allow participants to explore all of
the chests in one location before moving on and doing the same in
the other. Thus, increasing the number of chests could influence
how long participants choose to stay in one room, which could in
turn impact overall preference.
In summary, we found a tendency for individuals who had
high intolerance for uncertainty to first enter the previously rich
reward room while individuals who had low intolerance showed
no such bias, and first entered either of the rooms at equal
rates. This initial decision may have been influenced by foraging
strategies in addition to CPP. The results of the current study
suggest that IU may have broader implications beyond the realm
of anxiety, and is associated with changes in reward learning,
even in healthy individuals. Studies are currently underway to
examine the task in individuals undergoing treatment for opioid
addiction. Given the relationship between IU and anxiety, such
work should also compare addicts with and without comorbid
anxiety disorders. It remains unclear if IU is an independent
risk factor for both types of disorders, or if it is specific to
individuals with comorbid anxiety that may have led to drug
use in the first place, possibly as a form of self-medication
(Khantzian, 1985). The current CPP task could also be adapted
to examine a foraging scenario for further study of the effects of
personality on economic decision making. This possible foraging
task should include multiple rooms that the participant could
explore for possible rewards. The cost for moving to other
rooms could involve greater time delay that would reduce overall
opportunity to forage. Thus, future computer-based behavioral
tasks involving economic decision making could be used to test
an individual’s foraging behavior in the context of IU, as well
as other personality factors, and could also be used to assess
how personality affects the disorders such as substance abuse and
anxiety.
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